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QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 1
U.S.C. § 7, violates the equal protection component of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
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1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici, scholars and professors primarily of
family law and the law of equal protection, submit
this brief to respond directly to arguments advanced
by the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) that
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) is justified
because it advances child welfare. Specifically, BLAG
asserts that DOMA advances child welfare by: (1)
providing a stable structure to raise unintended and
unplanned offspring; (2) encouraging the rearing of
children by their biological parents; and (3) promoting childrearing by both a mother and a father.2 Each
of these purported justifications expresses and enforces a bare preference for the children of oppositesex couples as the only children entitled to the type of
permanency, stability and so-called “ideal” parenting
arrangements that DOMA allegedly confers. These
articulated justifications reveal that DOMA’s real
function is to draw invidious distinctions between
families headed by opposite-sex parents and families

1

This brief was not authored, in whole or in part, by
counsel for either party, and no person other than amici and
their academic institutions contributed monetarily to the
preparation or submission of this brief. This amicus brief is filed
pursuant to the blanket consent executed by the parties and
with the consent of Windsor.
2
Brief on the Merits for Respondent The Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives at 44-49,
United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2013)
(hereinafter Brief for Respondent).

2
headed by same-sex parents, and, by implication,
between the children in these families.
Amici’s scholarship refutes the validity of BLAG’s
child welfare justifications by delineating the legal,
economic and psychological injuries that DOMA
inflicts on children with same-sex parents. Amici’s
scholarship further demonstrates that DOMA is
categorically impermissible under this Court’s equal
protection jurisprudence because it punishes children
for the conduct of their parents.
------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
BLAG acknowledges that the Equal Protection
Clause “is essentially a direction that all persons
similarly situated should be treated alike,”3 and yet
DOMA patently violates this most fundamental
understanding of the equal protection guarantee. The
children of same-sex married couples are identically
situated to the children of opposite-sex married
couples, in terms of their need for and entitlement to
the types of family-supporting governmental rights
and benefits regulated by DOMA. Yet DOMA imposes
permanent class distinctions between these two
groups of children by penalizing the children of samesex couples merely because their parents are of the
same sex.
3

Brief for Respondent at 46-47 (citing City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).

3
Further, this Court has made clear that the
government may not punish children (by, for example,
denying them government-conferred benefits4) based
on moral disapproval of the parents’ relationship, or
5
in an effort to regulate the parents’ conduct. DOMA
punishes children for conduct over which they have
no control, which bespeaks invidious discrimination
rather than an effort to attain legitimate govern6
mental objectives.
4

Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (holding state
law that denied recovery to illegitimate child for the wrongful
death of the child’s mother violated equal protection).
5
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219-20 (1982) (quoting Trimble
v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)) (holding that arguments in
support of withholding state benefits to illegal entrants do not
apply to children of illegal entrants because they cannot affect
their parents’ conduct or their own status).
6
See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (holding
that private biases and the possible injury they might inflict are
not permissible considerations for removal of an infant child
from the custody of his mother); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety,
406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (striking down state law denying
workers’ compensation proceeds to non-marital children, explaining “[t]he status of illegitimacy has expressed through the
ages society’s condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the
bonds of marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the head
of an infant is illegal and unjust.”); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219-20
(striking down Texas law that withheld state education funds
from school districts that enrolled children of Mexican descent
not legally admitted to the United States, in part, because
“children can neither affect their parents’ conduct nor their own
status.”); Levy, 391 U.S. at 72 (“We conclude that it is invidious
to discriminate against [non-marital children] when no action,
conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm
that was done the mother.”).

4
Amici advance two main points. First, DOMA
affirmatively harms children. Although advocates and
commentators have thoroughly documented the ways
in which DOMA disadvantages same-sex couples, less
attention has been paid to the class of children adversely affected by DOMA’s discriminatory framework.7 As demonstrated below, a significant number
of children in the United States are being raised by
same-sex couples, as well as by single gay and lesbian
parents. DOMA inflicts immediate, concrete injuries
on a subset of these children, namely: those whose
families would otherwise benefit from federal familysupporting programs, but whose parents’ marriages,
while recognized on the state level, are rejected at the
federal level. Throughout this brief, this subset of
children will be referenced as “the excluded class of
7

For discussions of same-sex marriage from the perspective
of children, see Lewis A. Silverman, Suffer the Little Children:
Justifying Same-Sex Marriage from the Perspective of the Child,
102 W. VA. L. REV. 411, 412 (1999) (“[t]he preponderance of the
dialogue about same-sex marriage concentrates on the adult
partners and their derivative benefits from the relationship;
precious little focus is given to the rights of a child who may be a
product of a same-sex relationship”); Nancy D. Polikoff, For the
Sake of All Children: Opponents and Supporters of Same-Sex
Marriage Both Miss the Mark, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 573, 586
(2005); Courtney G. Joslin, Searching for Harm: Same-Sex
Marriage and the Well-Being of Children, 46 HARV. C.R.-C. L. L.
REV. 81, 85-89 (2011); Ruth Butterfield Isaacson, “Teachable
Moments”: The Use of Child-Centered Arguments in the SameSex Marriage Debate, 98 CAL. L. REV. 121, 131-51 (2010);
Catherine Smith, Equal Protection for Children of Same-Sex
Parents, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2037519.

5
children.”8 In addition to exacting an impermissible
legal and economic toll on the excluded class of children, DOMA also stigmatizes and psychologically
harms all children of same-sex couples by declaring
their families inferior to those headed by opposite-sex
9
couples. Far from promoting the welfare of children,
DOMA does nothing to help the children of oppositesex couples, while actively harming the children of
same-sex couples. Thus, this purported state interest
cannot provide even a rational basis for the law, as it
finds no “footing in the realities of the subject addressed by the legislation.”10
Second, DOMA fails in its entirety because it
serves an impermissible function: it punishes the
excluded class of children based on nothing more
than moral disapproval of their parents’ conduct.11
This Court has repeatedly struck down classifications
that are based in the majority’s bare moral disapproval of a disfavored social group as a violation of

8

Specifically, this class of children includes children of
same-sex couples who are lawfully married in one of the nine
marriage-equality states or the District of Columbia.
9
Cf. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954)
(“The impact [of racial segregation on children] is greater when
it has the sanction of law; for the policy of separating the races
is usually seen as denoting the inferiority of the negro group.”)
(quoting the lower court).
10
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993).
11
Weber, 406 U.S. at 171; Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433.

6
the Equal Protection Clause.12 Further, laws are
simply not permitted to permanently place a disfavored group of children into a disadvantaged class.13
------------------------------------------------------------------

ARGUMENT
I.

DOMA AFFIRMATIVELY HARMS CHILDREN

The children of same-sex couples are an important and increasingly sizable segment of our
society, in particular in those states that permit
same-sex couples to marry, where one-third of samesex married couples are raising children.14

12

See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (“the
fact that a governing majority in a State has traditionally
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”) (quoting
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)); U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973). See also Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 921-24 (2012) (discussing Lawrence and moral disapproval).
13
See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 208 (striking law that “permanently locked” a disfavored group of children “into the lowest socioeconomic class.”).
14
Sara Wildman, Children Speak for Same-Sex Marriage,
N.Y. Times (Jan. 20, 2010), http:// www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/
fashion/21kids.html; Williams Institute, United States Census
Snapshot: 2010, at 3, available at http://williamsinstitute.law.
ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Census2010Snapsho-US-v2.pdf.

7
BLAG asserts that DOMA advances child welfare
by: (1) providing a stable structure to raise unintended and unplanned offspring; (2) encouraging the
rearing of children by their biological parents; and (3)
promoting childrearing by both a mother and a fa15
ther. In fact, the real effect of DOMA is to place the
excluded class of children in a legal, economic and
social underclass16 and to stigmatize all children with
gay or lesbian parents.
A. The Children of Gay and Lesbian Parents Are an Important and Sizable
Segment of Society
An October 2011 study, “All Children Matter,”
estimated that “roughly two million children are
being raised by LGBT parents.”17 According to the
United States Census, twenty-eight percent of cohabitating same-sex couples are raising at least one child
under the age of eighteen.18 Of these, it is estimated
15

Brief for Respondent at 44-49.
See Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294,
338 (D. Conn. 2012) (noting DOMA’s effect of “limiting the
resources, protections, and benefits available to children of
same-sex parents.”).
17
See MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., ALL CHILDREN MATTER: HOW LEGAL AND SOCIAL INEQUALITIES HURT LGBT
FAMILIES (“ALL CHILDREN MATTER”), 1 (2011), available at:
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/10/pdf/all_children_
matter.pdf.
18
GARY J. GATES AND JASON OST, THE GAY AND LESBIAN
ATLAS 45 (2004).
16

8
that between 300,000 to one million children are
being raised by same-sex couples; the remainder are
children being raised by single gays and lesbians.19
“Contrary to stereotypes, children being raised by
same-sex couples are twice as likely to live in poverty
as children being raised by married heterosexual
20
households.” Further, same-sex couples of color are
raising children at a much higher rate than white
21
same-sex couples.
As for the children of families excluded by Section 3 of DOMA, while there is no consensus as to
exact numbers, it is estimated that one-third of samesex couples in marriage states are raising children.22
These numbers are likely to increase as more states
extend the institution of marriage to include their gay
and lesbian residents.
As discussed below, DOMA categorically excludes
these children from enjoying the family-supporting
rights, benefits and protections provided by the

19

Todd Brower, It’s Not Just Shopping, Urban Lofts and the
Lesbian Gay-by Boom: How Sexual Orientation Demographics
Can Inform Family Courts, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
1, 27 (2009).
20
ALL CHILDREN MATTER at 1.
21
Id.
22
Sara Wildman, Children Speak for Same-Sex Marriage,
N.Y. Times (Jan. 20, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/
fashion/21kids.html; Williams Institute, United States Census
Snapshot: 2010, at 3, available at http://williamsinstitute.law.
ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Census2010Snapsho-US-v2.pdf.

9
federal government to other families. Given the
substantial and adverse impact of DOMA on the
children of same-sex couples, BLAG’s contention that
excluding these families promotes the interests of
children is patently irrational.
B. DOMA Deprives Children of Important
Federal Benefits
BLAG concedes – as it must – that inclusion in
the safety net of federal family-supporting rights and
benefits is important to the stability of children.23
Indeed, it largely defends DOMA on the basis of the
benefits it creates for children – although BLAG fails
to explain how excluding some families and not
others advances this goal.24
BLAG’s argument is premised on the notion that
only some children are entitled to these benefits –
children of opposite-sex couples. Yet children in the
excluded class are deserving of these protections as
well. These children face the entire range of experiences that define family life, including family medical
crises, divorce, parental lay-offs, and parental death.25

23

Brief for Respondent at 3-4.
Id. at 44-49 (listing as the reasons for supporting DOMA
that it supports providing a stable structure in which to raise
children).
25
See Weber, 406 U.S. at 171 (“Both the statute in Levy and
the statute in the present case involved state created compensation schemes, designed to provide close relatives and dependents
(Continued on following page)
24

10
Tragically, when these events take place, DOMA
denies these children access to resources designed to
serve as safety nets to protect children within family
units – benefits that children with opposite-sex
married parents obtain as a matter of course.26
The exclusion of same-sex married couples from
over 1,100 federal marital rights and benefits has a
direct and harmful economic impact on their children.
For example, their families are denied the protections
of the Family Medical Leave Act, which was enacted
to help “balance the demands of the workplace with
the needs of families, to promote the stability and
economic security of families.”27 The FMLA permits
eligible employees to take up to twelve weeks of
unpaid leave to care for a child, spouse, or parent
with a serious health condition.28 It is beyond argument that the children of married same-sex couples
have the same interest in family security and stability as the children of married opposite-sex couples.
Excluding same-sex married couples from the FMLA
subjects the child and the entire household to

of a deceased a means of recovery for his often abrupt and
accidental death”).
26
For a list of privileges that benefit heterosexual couples
and opposite-sex parents, see Angela Onwuachi-Willig, ACCORDING TO OUR HEARTS: RHINELANDER V. RHINELANDER AND THE LAW
OF THE MULTIRACIAL FAMILY 159-61 (Yale University Press 2013).
27
29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) & (2).
28
29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).

11
“greater stress in attempting to cope with the serious
illness of a parent.”29
The excluded children also are prevented from
obtaining federal health insurance under the Federal
Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHB), which
offers coverage to federal civilian employees and their
family members. DOMA prohibits same-sex married
spouses from obtaining coverage, once again, exacting
an economic toll on the same-sex married household,
diverting economic resources from child-rearing, and
creating a burden that opposite-sex married couples
and their children do not carry.30
In addition, DOMA precludes same-sex married
couples from filing joint tax returns. These couples
pay more in taxes than their opposite-sex counterparts, “depleting the resources available to provide
for their children.”31
Finally, DOMA denies same-sex married couples
Social Security payments if a spouse dies or becomes

29

Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 339.
Id. at 299-300 (Plaintiffs Damon Savoy and John Weiss,
married under Connecticut law, were denied FEHB, diverting
funds from their three adopted children to cover health insurance for Weiss, their full-time stay-at-home dad).
31
Id. at 339. Plaintiffs Suzanne Artis and Geraldine Artis,
raising three children together, were denied the marital benefit
of filing their taxes jointly. Id. at 304.
30

12
disabled, reducing and/or diverting funds that would
be used to raise and support the couples’ children.32
These are merely a few examples of countless
scenarios revealing DOMA’s adverse effect on the
children of same-sex married couples. As the district
court in Pedersen v. OPM found:
DOMA is inimical to its stated purpose of
protecting children . . . DOMA does not alter
or restrict the ability of same-sex couples to
adopt children, a right conferred by state
law, and therefore, DOMA’s denial of federal
marital benefits to same-sex married couples
in fact leads to significant unintended and
untoward consequences by limiting the resources, protections and benefits available to
children of same-sex parents.33
Denial of these protections is not a one-time injury;
rather, this denial over the course of a child’s lifetime is cumulative and disrupts one of the primary

32

See Id. at 303 (surviving spouse of same-sex couple
denied Social Security lump-sum death benefit); Brief for
Respondent at 9 (quoting Senator Gramm as stating that
without DOMA, state recognition of same-sex marriage will
create new survivor benefits under Social Security).
33
Id. at 338. Amici do not necessarily agree that DOMA’s
consequences for children of same-sex parents were “unintended,” but, regardless of the original intent behind DOMA, BLAG’s
justifications for the law explicitly state a preference for the
welfare of children of opposite-sex parents over the welfare of
children of same-sex parents.

13
functions of family units – to provide stability (financial and otherwise) for future generations.
C. DOMA Inflicts Psychological Harm on
All Children with Gay or Lesbian Parents
In addition to the direct legal and economic harm
DOMA inflicts on children with same-sex married
parents, DOMA also inflicts psychological harm by
symbolically expressing the inferiority of families
headed by same-sex parents and the children in those
families.
BLAG’s characterization of DOMA as a childprotective measure that promotes “responsible procreation and child-rearing” is at odds with the adverse impact of the legislation on all children with
gay or lesbian parents. The effect and purpose of
DOMA is to stigmatize the families of which these
children are a part, and, by extension, to stigmatize
these children.34 As Dr. Gregory Herek (Professor of
Psychology at U.C. Davis, who is known for his
extensive empirical work investigating the impact of
structural prejudice in the context of sexual orientation) has observed:
34

Aff. of Gregory M. Herek, Ph.D. at ¶ 29, Mass. v. U.S.
Dept. of Health and Human Services, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012)
(No. 1:09-cv-11126-JLT), 2010 WL 604593 (“Stigma refers to an
enduring condition, status, or attribute that is negatively valued
by society . . . and that consequently disadvantages and disempowers those who have it.”).

14
Denying federal recognition to married
same-sex couples devalues and delegitimizes
their relationships. It conveys the government’s judgment that committed intimate relationships between people of the same sex
. . . are inferior to heterosexual relationships,
and that the participants in a same-sex relationship are less deserving of society’s recognition than heterosexual couples. . . . To the
extent that laws differentiate majority and
minority groups and accord them differing
statuses, they highlight the perceived “differentness” of the minority and thereby promote and perpetuate stigma.35
DOMA communicates to the children of same-sex
parents that their families, and the relationships
within their families, are morally objectionable and
functionally deficient.
This Court has previously considered state action
that stigmatizes children relevant to assessing the
constitutionality of such state action. Highlighting
the adverse psychological effects of de jure segregation on black children, for example, a unanimous
36
Court announced in Brown v. Board of Education:
To separate them from others of similar age
and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their

35
36

Aff. of Gregory M. Herek, Ph.D. at ¶¶ 28, 30.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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status in the community that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. . . . Segregation of white and
colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children.
The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law, for the policy of separating
the races is usually interpreted as denoting
the inferiority of the negro group.37
Children of same-sex parents, like the victims of
racial segregation, suffer the harmful psychological
effects of the condemnation of their families, which,
as the Court noted in Brown, is compounded by the
law’s sanction of this discrimination, and denotes the
inferiority of their families.
Courts have acknowledged psychic harm to
children as a constitutionally relevant consideration
in other contexts. For example, in Plyler v. Doe,38 the
Court examined the constitutionality of a Texas
statute authorizing local school districts to deny
enrollment to undocumented immigrant children. The
Court described the effect of the law as levying an
“inestimable toll . . . on the social, economic, intellectual, and psychological wellbeing of the individual.”39
The Court went on to emphasize the relevance of the
law’s harmful impact on children to its constitutionality, stating:
37
38
39

Id. at 494 (quoting the lower court).
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
Id. at 222
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Section 21.031 imposes a lifetime hardship
on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status. The stigma of
illiteracy will mark them for the rest of their
lives. . . . In determining the rationality of
§ 21. 031, we may appropriately take into account its costs to the Nation and to the innocent children who are its victims.40
This Court need not find that discrimination against
children of same-sex parents is identical to the discrimination against black children in Brown or immigrant children in Plyler in every respect. What is
clear from these cases, however, is that the stigma a
discriminatory law imposes – particularly on children
– is a worthy consideration when analyzing the
constitutionality of that law.
By categorically refusing to recognize the legally
sanctioned relationships of same-sex couples, DOMA
deprives children in these families of important,
family-supporting benefits that they would otherwise
enjoy. Further, by declaring that the children of samesex couples are somehow less worthy than the children of opposite-sex couples, DOMA stigmatizes all
children with gay or lesbian parents.
DOMA treats families headed by same-sex couples as second-class families, and thereby relegates
children in these families to second-class status
relative to their peers. The assertion that DOMA is
40

Id. at 223-24
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justified by a legitimate or important governmental
interest in protecting children is thoroughly undermined by the reality that DOMA stigmatizes samesex families and inflicts psychological harm on the
children of such families, while purporting to protect
children generally.
II.

DOMA FAILS UNDER ANY LEVEL OF
SCRUTINY BECAUSE IT PUNISHES
CHILDREN BASED ON THE CONDUCT
OF THEIR PARENTS

The Court’s equal protection jurisprudence has
expressed a consistent, special concern for discrimination against children.41 Why? Because discrimination against children always necessarily implicates
two of the Equal Protection Clause’s core values:
promoting a society in which one’s success or failure
42
is the result of individual merit, and discouraging
the creation of permanent class or caste distinctions.43
41

See Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 7 (1983) (noting explicitly a “special concern” for illegitimate children); San Antonio Ind.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 111 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the Court has a “special interest” in
education because it is the “principal instrument in awakening
the child” to cultural values, preparing children for professional
training, and helping children adjust to the environment.
(quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493)).
42
See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222. See also Pollvogt at 926
(identifying meritocracy as core equal protection value).
43
See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
See also Pollvogt at 926 (discussing goal of Equal Protection
Clause to eliminate laws that tend to create social castes).

18
Where laws function to place children in a distinct,
disadvantaged class based on the conduct of their
parents, these principles are violated.44
DOMA directly controverts these important
prohibitions. Through its own proffered justifications
for the law (that is, the notion that DOMA promotes
child welfare), BLAG makes clear that DOMA not
only expresses and enforces a preference for oppositesex couples over same-sex couples, but also expresses
and enforces a preference for the children of oppositesex couples over the children of same-sex couples.
Thus, BLAG’s justifications directly implicate this
Court’s lengthy history of protecting children against
such unfair (and inherently invidious) discrimination.
A. The Court’s Treatment of Discrimination Against Non-Marital Children
This Court has consistently expressed special
concern with discrimination against children – in
particular protecting their right to self-determination
and to flourish fully in society, without being hampered by legal, economic and social barriers imposed
45
by virtue of the circumstances of their birth. This
44

Plyler, 452 U.S. at 219-20.
See Weber, 406 U.S. at 175 (stating that condemning a
child for the actions of his parents is “illogical and unjust.”);
Levy, 391 U.S. at 72 (holding that it is invidious to discriminate
against illegitimate children for the actions by people over which
they have no control).
45
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concern is perhaps most strongly expressed in the
Court’s treatment of non-marital children.
The United States has a long history of discrimination against children born to unmarried parents.46
Because of society’s moral condemnation of their
parents’ conduct, they were denied legal and social
benefits to which marital children were entitled. They
could not inherit property; further, they were not
entitled to financial parental support, wrongful death
recovery, workers’ compensation, social security, and
47
other government benefits.
In the early 1940s, criticism of the treatment of
non-marital children began to take root and became a
part of the political and legal debates of the civil
rights movement.48 In 1968, Professor Harry Krause
and civil rights lawyer Norman Dorsen advanced
child-centered arguments in Levy v. Louisiana, the
46

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *447 (“rights [of a
non-marital child] are very few, being only such as he can
acquire; for he can inherit nothing, being looked upon as the son
of nobody.”); Gareth W. Cook, Bastards, 47 TEX. L. REV. 326, 327
n.11 (1969). But see Levy, 391 U.S. at 70 (“We start from the
premise that illegitimate children are not ‘nonpersons.’ They are
humans, live, and have their being. They are clearly ‘persons’
within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.).
47
See Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma
and Discrimination Against Non-marital Children, 63 FLA. L.
REV. 345, 346-47 (2011).
48
Martha Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate
Family, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 73, 90 (2003)
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first equal protection challenge on behalf of nonmarital children.49
Louise Levy, an unmarried African American
mother with five young children, died from the medi50
cal malpractice of a state hospital. Thelma Levy,
Louise’s sister, sued Louisiana on behalf of the Levy
children, who were prohibited from a “right to recover” because they were born outside of marriage.51 The
Louisiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
dismissal of the children’s claim on the grounds that
they were not “legitimate,” insofar as “morals and
general welfare . . . discourage[ ] bringing children
into the world out of wedlock.”52
In a groundbreaking legal victory for children,
this Court reversed. The Court, citing Brown, explained its departure from its normal practice of
deferring to legislative decisions: “we have been
49

Brief of Appellee, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)
No. 508, 1968 WL 112826; see also, Smith, Equal Protection for
Children of Same-Sex Parents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2037519.
50
John C. Gray and David Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American
Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2-3
(1969).
51
Id. at 3.
52
Id. (quoting Levy v. Louisiana, 192 So. 2d 193, 195 (La.
Ct. App. 1967)). The Louisiana Supreme Court denied certiorari
because it found the Court of Appeals made no error of law. Levy
v. Louisiana, 250 La. 25 (1967).
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extremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil rights
and have not hesitated to strike down an invidious
classification even though it had history and tradition
on its side.”53 The Court determined Louisiana’s
actions were driven by invidious discrimination
because the child’s status as “illegitimate” was unrelated to the injury to the mother.54
Four years after Levy, in Weber v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co.,55 this Court struck another blow to
government conduct that penalized children based on
moral disdain for the parents’ conduct. Henry Clyde
Stokes had died of work-related injuries. At the time
of his death, he lived with Willie Mae Weber.56 Stokes
and Weber were not married, but had five children.57
One of the children was born to Stokes and Weber,
while four others had been born to Stokes and his
lawful wife, Adlay Jones, who had previously been
committed to a mental hospital.58 Weber and Stokes’
59
second child was born shortly after Stokes’ death.
The four marital children filed a workers’ compensation claim for their father’s death, while Willie
Mae Weber sought compensation benefits on behalf of
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

Levy, 391 U.S. at 71.
Id. at 72; see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216.
406 U.S. 164 (1972).
Id. at 165.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the non-marital children.60 Louisiana law awarded
workers’ compensation proceeds to a deceased worker’s children born of his marriage, while the children
born outside the marriage were denied those same
proceeds.61
Once again, this Court reversed the Louisiana
Supreme Court’s decision, which had allowed laws to
penalize non-marital children based on their parents’
conduct. The Court articulated a principle that is now
well-established: treating children born outside of
marriage differently than those born inside it is
impermissible discrimination.62 The Court explained
that marital and non-marital children were identically situated with respect to their interest in these
benefits: “An unacknowledged illegitimate child may
suffer as much from the loss of a parent as a child
born within wedlock or an illegitimate later acknowledged.”63
Weber, the most well-known and cited nonmarital status case, reiterated that a state may not
express its moral objection of parental conduct by
withholding government benefits from the child. To
do so places the child at an economic disadvantage for
conduct over which the child has no control. In Weber,
the Court conceded that the state’s interest “in
60
61
62
63

Id. at 165-66.
Id. at 175-76.
Id. at 169.
Id.
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protecting ‘legitimate family relationships’ ” was
weighty.64 The Court acknowledged that “the regulation and protection of the family unit have indeed
been a venerable state concern.”65 Importantly, the
Court did not “question the importance of that interest” but did question “how the challenged statute will
promote it.”66 The Court ultimately concluded that
“[t]he state interest in family relationships is not
67
served by the statute” explaining, “[t]he inferior
classification of unacknowledged illegitimates bears,
in this instance, no relationship to those recognized
purposes of recovery which workmen’s compensation
statutes commendably serve.”68
In other words, while promoting marriage and
childbirth within marriage may be a valid state
interest in the abstract, the Court rejected the contention that this interest is advanced by excluding a
group of children who have an identical interest in
the benefits at issue, simply because that group of
children is disfavored.
Similarly, although it is unusual for the federal
government to be in the business of regulating marriage at all, BLAG’s purported concern for promoting

64
65
66
67
68

Id. at 173.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 175.
Id.
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childbirth in marriage may appear to be a superficially legitimate governmental interest. But it is unclear
how excluding families headed by married same-sex
couples advances this interest. Protecting the family
unit is one matter; expressing a bare preference for
one type of family is another.
In light of this history and legal precedent,69 it is
apparent that BLAG’s argument that DOMA somehow protects children suffers from the same, fatally
flawed reasoning that had been used to justify discrimination against non-marital children. BLAG
seeks to permanently exclude an entire class of
children from access to family-supporting federal
benefits because it finds their parents’ conduct to be
objectionable. This is not a sufficient basis for such
profound discrimination.
The rationales articulated in Levy and Weber
formed early equal protection jurisprudence and
spoke to the importance of the social and economic
rights unique to children.70 That the history of discrimination at issue in Levy and Weber turned on the
69

Between 1968 to 1986, this Court heard more than a
dozen cases challenging laws that disadvantaged non-marital
children, ultimately holding that this classification was of such
concern that differential treatment of non-marital children
warranted intermediate scrutiny. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S.
456, 465 (1988).
70
See Laurence C. Nolan, “Unwed Children” and Their
Parents Before the United States Supreme Court from Levy to
Michael H.: Unlikely Participants in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 28 (1999).
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distinction between marital and non–marital children
(as compared to the distinction drawn by DOMA
between children of same-sex married parents and
children of opposite-sex married parents) does not
insulate BLAG’s justifications from a determination
that DOMA violates the values that animate the
Equal Protection Clause. The fact that DOMA purports to promote “legitimate family relationships” by
preferring some children over others is an insufficient
justification for the discrimination it enacts and the
harms it inflicts.
B. The Court’s Broader Concern with
Discrimination Against Children
The Court has additionally expressed special
concern about unfair discrimination against children
in other contexts. Specifically, Weber’s moral and
jurisprudential clarity about discrimination against
children was echoed years later in Plyler v. Doe.71 At
issue in Plyler was a state law that sought to deny
public education to the children of undocumented
immigrants. In deciding the case, the Court relied
heavily on the factual findings of the district court
to the effect that (1) the law did nothing to improve
the quality of education in the state and (2) it instead tended to “permanently lock[] the children of

71

457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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undocumented immigrants into the lowest socioeconomic class.”72
The Court highlighted the foundational mission
of the Equal Protection Clause: “to work nothing less
than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious
class-based legislation.”73 To be sure, not all laws that
distinguish between groups fall under this prohibition. But laws that determine the legal, economic and
social status of children, based on the circumstances
of their birth, surely do. As the Court explained in
Plyler, “[l]egislation imposing special disabilities upon
groups disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond
their control suggests the kind of ‘class or caste’
treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was
designed to abolish.”74
The Court went on to emphasize that, even
though it was arguably permissible to disapprove of
the presence of undocumented immigrants in the
United States, this concern did not justify “imposing
disabilities on the minor children of illegal immigrants.”75 In support of its holding, the Court announced, “Even if the state found it expedient to
control the conduct of adults by acting against their
children, legislation directing the onus of a parent’s
misconduct against his children does not comport
72
73
74
75

Id. at 208.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 216 n.14 (emphasis added).
Id. at 219-20.
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with fundamental conceptions of justice.”76 Thus,
discrimination against children is unjust in part
because it contravenes “one of the goals of the Equal
Protection Clause . . . [which is] the abolition of
governmental barriers to advancement on the basis of
77
individual merit.”
The Equal Protection Clause mandates that
those who are similarly situated be treated alike.78
The Plyler Court implemented this mandate by
determining whether the children of undocumented
immigrants were different in a way that was relevant
to children’s interest in receiving an education. Similarly, the relevant inquiry with respect to DOMA is
whether the children of married same-sex couples are
different in a way that is relevant to their interest in
benefitting from the myriad family-supporting programs the government provides to promote stability
and opportunity in our society. The answer is unequivocally “no.”
C. Moral Disapproval of the Parents’ Relationship is Not a Permissible Basis
for Punishing Children
Finally, the Court has gone so far as to categorically reject moral disapproval of parental conduct and
choices, even when enforcing such disapproval may,
76
77
78

Id.
Id. at 222.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439 (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 202).
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at the time, be viewed by government decision makers as serving the best interests of the child. In
Palmore v. Sidoti,79 the Court took the unusual step of
reviewing a state family court’s custody award.
Following the divorce, the mother in the case was
awarded custody of the couple’s infant child. Both the
father and the mother were white. Subsequent to the
divorce, the mother entered into a relationship with
and married a black man. The father sought custody
of the child based on these “changed circumstances.”
The family court explicitly found that there was
no concern about either the mother’s or the stepfather’s parental fitness. Nonetheless, the court took to
heart the recommendation of a counselor, who expressed concern about the “social consequences” for a
child being raised in “an interracial marriage.” Specifically, the counselor opined:
“The wife [petitioner] has chosen for herself
and for her a child, a life-style unacceptable
to the father and to society . . . The child is,
or at school age will be, subject to environ80
mental pressures not of choice.”
On this basis, “the [family] court concluded that the
best interest of the child would be served by awarding
custody to the father.”81 While acknowledging that the
father’s disapproval of the relationship was not a
79
80
81

466 U.S. 429 (1984).
Id. at 431.
Id.
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sufficient basis for awarding him custody, the family
court determined that because society did not yet
fully accept interracial relationships, the child would
inevitably “suffer from . . . social stigmatization.”82 On
this basis, the family court awarded custody to the
father.
This Court applied strict scrutiny to the family
court’s decision, and concluded that the stated interest in serving the best interests of the child was “a
duty of the highest order.”83 However, the Court’s chief
concern was in regard to the actual function of the
ruling, which was to give legal effect to private bias.84
The Court held that the family court’s decision, which
determined the rights of the child based on societal
disapproval of the parents, violated equal protection,
famously stating: “Private biases may be outside the
reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
indirectly, give them effect.”85
Here, DOMA denies children benefits by giving
effect to private bias in two different ways. First, as
detailed above, it gives effect to private bias against
same-sex couples. Second, as discussed below, it gives
effect to private bias regarding impermissible genderrole stereotypes in parenting.

82
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Id.
Id. at 433.
See id. at 433.
Id.
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BLAG baldly asserts that one of the justifications
for DOMA is that DOMA serves to promote “childrearing by both a mother and a father,”86 which it
considers an optimal parenting situation. BLAG
grounds the claim that opposite-sex parenting is
superior in “common sense” and “the experience of
87
countless parents.” This, according to BLAG, represents a legitimate state interest, because “it is
rational for the federal government to encourage
childrearing in situations in which children have a
mother and a father,” because there are “biological
differentiation[s] in the roles of mothers and fathers”
and “typical differences between men and women in
parenting style, size and voice tone.”88
The insistence that “opposite-sex parenting”
necessarily leads to differentiation in parental roles is
inescapably grounded in impermissible gender-role
stereotyping. “The gender-based assumptions that
women and men bring inherent differences to childrearing and parental responsibilities – differences
which render same-sex couples incapable of successful child-rearing by comparison – rest on gender
stereotyping, as scholars have explained.”89
86

Brief for Respondent at 48.
Brief for Respondent at 50.
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Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Nos. 12-15388, 12-15409
(9th Cir. June 4, 2012), 2012 WL 2132484.
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It is well established that laws may not rely on
overbroad generalizations about different talents,
capacities, or preferences of males and females.90
Assumptions about expected parenting roles that
men and women must or should perform based on
gender alone falls squarely within the gender stereotyping that has been deemed impermissible in equal
protection law, including in decisions about parents
and parenting.
91
For example, in Caban v. Mohammed, the Court
struck down a New York law that permitted unwed
mothers to block the adoption of their children by

– Legitimacy, Dual-Gender Parenting, 28 LAW & INEQ. 307, 326
(2010). See also Carlos A. Ball, The Blurring of the Lines:
Children and Bans on Interracial Unions and Same-Sex Marriages, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2733, 2768 (“The normative notion[]
that optimal child care depends on something unique about
mothers as women conflates social expectations and roles
imposed on parents according to their sex/gender with seemingly
natural and intrinsic characteristics that distinguish women
from men (and vice versa).”); Carlos A. Ball, Lesbian and Gay
Families: Gender Nonconformity and the Implications of Difference, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 691, 725-48 (2003); Nan D. Hunter, The
Sex Discrimination Argument in Gay Rights Cases, 9 J.L. &
POL’Y 397, 413 (2000).
90
See U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533; see also Nevada
Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003)
(recognizing “pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family
members is women’s work” an insufficient justification under
Equal Protection Clause); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279-80
(1979) (holding invalid justification based on state’s preference
for allocation of family responsibilities under which wife plays a
dependent role).
91
441 U.S. 380 (1979).
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denying consent to potential adoptees. The law did
not, however, extend this consent-based objection to
unwed fathers. The father in the case challenged the
gender-based distinction as an equal protection
violation after his parental rights were terminated.
The mother argued that the distinction between
unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers was based
on a fundamental difference between the sexes,
because “a natural mother, absent special circumstances, bears a closer relationship with her child”
than a father.92 This Court disagreed, finding that
“maternal and paternal roles are not invariably
different in importance,” and, even if unwed mothers
were closer to their newborn children, “this generalization concerning parent-child relations would become less acceptable . . . as the age of the child
increased.”93 The court “reject[ed] . . . the claim that
the broad gender-based distinction of [the statute] is
required by any universal difference between maternal and paternal relations at every phase of a child’s
development.”94
As the state did in Caban, BLAG here relies
on impermissible, overbroad generalizations about
different talents, capacities, or preferences of males
and females.95 This not only fails to provide a rational
92

Id. at 387-89.
Id. at 389.
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basis for a law; it embodies a form of categorically
impermissible discrimination.
In conclusion, the parallels between the states’
arguments in support of discriminatory legislation in
Levy, Weber, Plyler, Palmore, and Caban and BLAG’s
argument in support of DOMA are impossible to
ignore. The reasoning and holdings in these cases
instruct that it is impermissible for laws to disadvantage children for matters outside of their control,
in an effort to control the conduct of their parents, or
as an expression of moral disapproval of their parents’ relationships and conduct.
------------------------------------------------------------------

CONCLUSION
The child-welfare justifications advanced by
BLAG in support of DOMA embody the very essence
of invidious discrimination: BLAG contends, in essence, that families headed by married, opposite-sex
couples are benefitted because families headed by
married, same-sex couples are excluded from important rights and benefits – rights and benefits that
serve the general social good of promoting family
stability. Multiple courts have found that DOMA does
preference for allocation of family responsibilities under which
wife plays a dependent role); and Nevada Dept. of Human
Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003) (recognizing
“pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family members is
women’s work” an insufficient justification under Equal Protection Clause).
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nothing to advance the interests that BLAG invokes
to justify the law. But it is beyond argument that
DOMA serves to harm – both concretely and symbolically – the families it excludes, including the children
in those families.
As this Court has thoughtfully observed,
[T]imes can blind us to certain truths and
later generations can see that laws once
thought necessary and proper in fact serve
only to oppress. As the Constitution endures,
persons in every generation can invoke its
principles in their own search for greater
freedom.96
Although BLAG may morally disapprove of same-sex
marriage, DOMA’s harmful impact on generations of
children of same-sex couples renders it ineffective,
unjust, and patently impermissible.
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Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579.
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The judgment of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals should be affirmed.
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